Law Philosophy The Practice Of Theory 2 Vols 1st Edition

Law and PhilosophyThe Practice of Theory : Essays in Honor of George AnastaploAristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and JusticeSpringer Science & Business Media

The book investigates the role of law and legal experts in the organisational dynamics of a population, demonstrating that law is a stable practice among those who (in virtue of the special knowledge they master) are called upon to select the ‘normative facts’ of a population, i.e. the interactional standards that are proclaimed as binding for the entire population by the publicly recognised legal experts (whose peremptory judgments can be only revised by peers). It proposes an integration of the recent research outcomes achieved in three different areas of study: legal positivism, legal institutionalism and legal pluralism and examines the notions of rule, coercion, institution, practice elaborated by significant theorists in the mentioned areas and illumine both their merits and flaws. Furthermore it advances a notion of law and a description of the legal field which are able to account for the nature of the legal filed as the cradle of the social order. new back cover copy: In an era characterized by a streaking global pluralism, the collapse of many state agencies, the emergence of multiple sources of law, and the rise of informal justice, the idea of a unitary and homogenous legal system seems old-fashioned. But philosophers,

sociologists and anthropologists still hold many debates on the nature of law and its function, which is that law represents an institution that characterizes any orderly social context of human beings, and this book plunges into the center of those debates. Self-sufficiency of Law: A Critical-institutional Theory of Social Order investigates the role of law and legal experts in the organizational dynamics of a population. It demonstrates that law is a stable practice among those who are called upon to select the “normative facts” of a population, that is, the interactional standards that are proclaimed as binding for the entire population by the publicly recognized legal experts. To do this, the author proposes an integration of the recent research outcomes achieved in three different areas of study—legal positivism, legal institutionalism and legal pluralism. He examines the notions of rule, coercion, institution and practice elaborated on by significant theorists in these fields, highlighting both the merits and flaws and ultimately advancing a notion of law and a description of the legal field which are able to account for the nature of the legal field as the cradle of social order. This text covers key guidelines for empirical research and political activities in Western and non-Western countries.

From articles centering on the detailed and doctrinal exposition of the law to those which reside almost wholly within the realm of philosophical ethics, this volume affords comprehensive treatment to both sides of the philosophico-legal equation. Systematic and sustained coverage of the many dimensions of legal thought gives ample expression to the true breadth and depth of the

philosophy of law, with coverage of: The modes of knowing and the kinds of normativity used in the law; Studies in international, constitutional, criminal, administrative, persons and property, contracts and tort law-including their historical origins and worldwide ramifications; Current legal cultures such as common law and civilian, European, and Aboriginal; Influential jurisprudents and their biographies; All influential schools and methods

"Among books of similar scope, this is the recognized classic. Those who read this book will have the strange privilege of thinking things together in the law from the beginning of world history to the moment Pound sent his writings to the printer."--American Bar Association Journal.

Academic legal production, when it focuses on the study of law, generally grasps this concept on the basis of a reference to positive law and its practice. This book differs clearly from these analyses and integrates the legal approach into the philosophy of normative language, philosophical realism and pragmatism. The aim is not only to place the examination of law in the immanence of its practice, but also to take note of the fact that legal enunciation must be taken seriously. In order to arrive at this analysis, it is necessary to go beyond traditional perspectives and to base reflection on an investigation of the conditions for enunciating law in our democracies. This analysis thus offers a renewal of the ethics inherent in the action of jurists and an original reflection on the role of certain legal tools such as concepts, categories, or "provisions". In this sense, the

work nourishes its originality not only by the transversality of its approach, but also by the will to situate legal thought in concrete forms of its implementation. The book will be essential reading for academics working in the areas of legal theory, legal philosophy and constitutional theory.

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen ?s Dilemma, the Rhetor ?s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions. The contributions in this work constitute the first results of the ANR-DFG joint research project “JuriLog” (Jurisprudence and Logic), which aims at fostering the cooperation between legal scholars and philosophers. On the one hand, lawyers and legal scholars have an interest in emphasizing the logical character of legal reasoning. In this respect, the present enquiry examines the question of how logic, especially newer forms of dialogical logic, can be made fruitful as a significant area of philosophy for jurisprudence and legal practice. On the other hand, logicians find in legal reasoning a striving towards clear definitions and inference-procedures that is relevant to their discipline. In order to fully understand such reciprocal relationships, it is necessary to bridge

the gap between law, logic and philosophy in contemporary academic research. The essays collected in this volume all work towards this common goal. The book is divided in three sections. In the first part, the strong relation between Roman Law and logic is explored with respect to the analysis of disjunctive statements in legal acts. The second part focuses on Leibniz ?s legal theory. The third part, finally, is dedicated to current interactions between law and logic. This title was first published in 2001. Legal systems are posited on the assumption that people are rational intentional agents who can choose to follow or break the law. This book connects the common interests of lawyers and philosophers in the meaning of intention and its relation to responsibility in legal, moral and political contexts.

This book present a structure for understanding and exploring the semiotic character of law and law systems. Cultivating a deep understanding for the ways in which lawyers make meaning—the way in which they help make the world and are made, in turn by the world they create —can provide a basis for consciously engaging in the work of the law and in the production of meaning. The book first introduces the reader to the idea of semiotics in general and legal semiotics in particular, as well as to the major actors and shapers of the field, and to the heart of the matter: signs. The second part studies the development of the strains of thinking that together now define semiotics, with attention being paid to the

pragmatics, psychology and language of legal semiotics. A third part examines the link between legal theory and semiotics, the practice of law, the critical legal studies movement in the USA, the semiotics of politics and structuralism. The last part of the book ties the different strands of legal semiotics together, and closely looks at semiotics in the lawyer's toolkit—such as: text, name and meaning. ?

Ever since Hart ?s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when there is a social rule in a group? Does it share the nature of collective intentional action? The book explores the main responses to these questions, and claims that they fail on two main counts: current theories do not explain officials ? beliefs that they are under a duty qua members of an institution, and they do not explain officials ? disagreement about the content of these institutional duties. Based on a particular theory of collective action, the author elaborates then an account of certain institutions, and claims that the practice is an institutional practice of sorts. This would explain officials ? beliefs in institutional duties, and officials ? disagreement about those duties. The book should be of interest to legal philosophers, but

also to those concerned with group and social action theories and, more generally, with the nature of institutions.

This collection of original essays by 38 leading legal theorists marks the 75th anniversary of Karl Llewellyn's essay "On Philosophy in American Law." Llewellyn's succinct and audacious review of the history of American legal philosophy and the prospects for an emerging "legal realism" provides the model for this collection. The diverse and wide-ranging essays describe in direct terms the state of legal philosophy today, often in a manner that provides an accessible summary of the authors' previous work.

This examination of the interface between criminal law, philosophy and public health brings together international experts from a variety of disciplines and areas of practice, including law, public health, philosophy, health policy and ethics. It will be of particular relevance to academics, policy-makers, lawyers and public health practitioners.

A collaboration of leading historians of European law and philosophers of law and politics identifying and explaining the practice of interpretation of law in the 18th century. The goal: establishing the actual practice in the Age of Enlightenment, and explaining why this was the case. The ideology of the Age was that law, i.e., the will of the sovereign, can be explicitly and appropriately stated, thus making

interpretation redundant. However, the reality was that in the 18th century, there was no one leading source of national law that would be the object of interpretation. Instead, there was a plurality of sources of law: the Roman Law, local customary law, and the royal ordinance. However, in deciding a case in a court of law, the law must speak with one voice. Hence, interpretation to unify the norms was inevitable. What was the process? What role did justification in terms of reason, the hallmark of the Enlightenment, play? These are some of the questions addressed.

Life is about exercising choices!So, you read recently that many lawyers are depressed and unhappy about their profession. Pick up almost any bar journal and you will read about how "leadership" is putting together more educational programs, so you can learn how to be happier in your chosen profession.I've got news for you. There are a ton of us out there who have fun, make money, and enjoy being lawyers all without screwing up our personal lives.You should read this book if you:? Are the owner of a small law firm and don't have any hang-ups about talking about your law firm in terms of enhancing profits.? Like strategizing about how to build a real business that brings you joy and happiness.? Are okay with only choosing clients you actually like working with.? Believe that building a workforce that looks forward to Monday morning

sounds like something you'd like to do.Don't waste your time on this book if you:? Think that being the best lawyer in town entitles you to anything.? Believe that the path to prosperity in the legal field is "do good work and they will come."? Are resolutely against viewing your law firm as a profit-making machine.? Think that any one book will turn your life around in a week or so.The choice is yours.

This book sets out to assist counselors-to-be in developing an informed ethical conscience by first exploring and developing a theoretical understanding of the subject. The goal of the book is to acquaint readers with relevant ethical theory and to provide them exposure to real life ethical issues that are often messy, complex, multifaceted dilemmas that defy simple solutions. In this process, readers are encouraged to explore their own moral and ethical value systems as well as the codes they work from and to begin the formulation of an informed ethical conscience for making sound moral/ethical judgments.

The philosophy of law - inquiry into the origins, nature and theory of laws and legal principles, and those concepts that structure the practice of law - is of great importance in moral and political philosophy, as well as being a major area of philosophical concern in its own right. Clear, concise and comprehensive, this is the ideal introduction to the philosophy of law for those studying it for the first time. Drawing upon both the analytic Anglo-

American and Continental schools of philosophy, Law: Key Concepts in Philosophy summarises the work of key thinkers in the philosophy of law, including Rousseau, Hobbes, Austin, Hegel, Mill, Marx, Dworkin and Rawls. It provides lucid and thorough explication and analysis of central concerns in legal philosophy, covering criminal law, civil law and constitutional law. Finally, the text also addresses key issues in contemporary philosophy of law, including human rights, international law and questions of race and gender.

The concept of law lies at the heart of our social and political life. Legal philosophy, or jurisprudence, explores the notion of law and its role in society, illuminating its meaning and its relation to the universal questions of justice, rights, and morality. In this Very Short Introduction Raymond Wacks analyses the nature and purpose of the legal system, and the practice by courts, lawyers, and judges. Wacks reveals the intriguing and challenging nature of legal philosophy with clarity and enthusiasm, providing an enlightening guide to the central questions of legal theory. In this revised edition Wacks makes a number of updates including new material on legal realism, changes to the approach to the analysis of law and legal theory, and updates to historical and anthropological jurisprudence. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and

challenging topics highly readable.

Contributions to Law, Philosophy and Ecology: Exploring Re-Embodiments is a preliminary contribution to the establishment of re-embodiments as a theoretical strand within legal and ecological theory, and philosophy. Re-embodiments are all those contemporary practices and processes that exceed the epistemic horizon of modernity. As such, they offer a plurality of alternative modes of theory and practice that seek to counteract the ecocidal tendencies of the Anthropocene. The collection comprises eleven contributions approaching re-embodiments from a multiplicity of fields, including legal theory, eco-philosophy, eco-feminism and anthropology. The contributions are organized into three parts: 'Beyond Modernity', 'The Sacred Dimension' and 'The Legal Dimension'. The collection is opened by a comprehensive introduction that situates re-embodiments in theoretical context. Whilst closely bound with embodiment and new materialist theory, this book contributes a unique voice that echoes diverse political processes contemporaneous to our times. Written in an elegant and accessible language, the book will appeal to undergraduates, postgraduates and established scholars alike seeking to understand and take re-embodiments further, both politically and theoretically.

Presenting feminist readings of texts from the legal philosophical and jurisprudential canon, the papers collected here offer an interdisciplinary and critical challenge to established modes of reading law. Feminist approaches to law usually take the form of either critical engagements with legal doctrine, legal concepts and

ideas, or critical assessments of the effects that specific areas of law have upon the lives of women. This collection, however, although rooted in feminist legal scholarship, takes the established canon of legal texts as the object of inquiry. Taking as their common starting point the fact that legal texts are plural and open to multiple readings, all the contributions in this collection offer subversive, but supplementary, interpretations of the legal canon. In this respect, however, they do not merely sustain an array of feminist styles and theories of reading; revealing and re-appropriating the plural space of legal interpretation, they seek to open a hitherto unexplored arena for a feminist politics of law. Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy is a thoroughly researched interdisciplinary collection that will interest students and scholars of Law, Philosophy, and Feminism.

This volume contains a broad range of essays by scholars interested in the interactions between law and philosophy. It examines the themes of the nature of law; and the State, the citizen, and the law.

This advanced introduction to central questions in legal philosophy attempts to breathe new life into stalled research.

Democratic legal systems have recently been subject to rapid and multi-directional processes of change. There are numerous sociological, technological, ideological, or purely political processes which result in law's amendment and transformation. This book argues that this legal change is best understood from a political philosophy perspective. This can be used as an

interpretative device to understand the ongoing processes of change as well as their outcomes such as new laws, judicial interpretations, or constitutional amendments. The work has three main objectives: to provide deeper understanding of the problems of legal change within the diversity of Western political and legal thought; to examine the development of the processes of change in terms of their normative and prudential acceptability; to interpret actual processes of change with a view to the general theoretical and normative background. The book is divided into three parts: Part I sets the scene and is focused on the general issues important for understanding and evaluating legal change from the perspective of political philosophy; Part II focuses on the spectrum of politico-philosophical justifications present in the political culture of democratic states; Part III offers selected case studies to specify and apply the philosophical ideas in the previous parts. The book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of law and jurisprudence, including comparative legal studies and human rights law, political theory, and philosophy.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other.

In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

To scholars of Western intellectual history Hegel is one of the most important of all political thinkers, but politicians and other "down-to-earth" persons see his speculative philosophy as far removed from their immediate concerns. Put off by his difficult terminology, many participants in practical politics may also believe that Hegel's idealism unduly legitimates the status quo. By examining his justification of legal punishment, this book introduces a Hegel quite different from these preconceptions:

an acute critic of social practices. Mark Tunick draws on recently published but still untranslated lectures of Hegel's philosophy of right to take us to the core of Hegel's political thought. Hegel opposes radical criticism like that later offered by Marx, but, argues Tunick, he employs "immanent" criticism instead. For instance, Hegel claims that punishment is the criminal's right and makes the criminal free. From this standpoint, he defends specific features of the practice of punishment that accord with this retributive ideal and criticizes other features that contradict it. In a lucid account of what Hegel means by right and freedom, Tunick addresses Hegel specialists and those interested in criminal law, the interpretation of legal institutions and social practices, and justification from an immanent standpoint. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Our age is characterized by radical subjectivism.

Which is to say: There is no agreement on any absolute standard of value. Indeed, there is no agreement even on truth itself. And as a matter of fact, the very concept of objective, absolute truth has been cast aside in favor of “truths” – your truth, my truth, whoever’s truth. The result is the abandonment of the pursuit of truth at all, in favor of convictions, emotional appeals in favor of those convictions, and the pursuit of political power to put those convictions in practice. This state of affairs will come as no surprise to those, like Friedrich Julius Stahl, who track the way people think, who know that ideas have consequences and that thought eventually feeds into practice. This is especially the case with legal philosophy. Here is where theory and practice confront each other, where the rubber meets the road. And the history of legal philosophy is the history of ideas having consequences. This history can tell us a great deal about how we arrived at the current state of affairs. When we look at it, we find that the key player in this history is natural law. Once the mainstay of ethical and legal discourse, it is now a forgotten relic. But natural law paved the way for the triumph of subjectivism in the modern world. A strange thing, considering that natural law was supposed to embody an objective standard for judging man-made law. It ended up eliminating that standard. How this came about is the burden of The Rise and Fall of Natural Law. Natural law was born

of the Greeks and Romans, adopted by the Christian church, and converted into the bulwark of Christian ethical and legal science. But along the way it became disengaged from the church; and when it did, it played a central role in secularizing Western civilization. Stahl follows this career, from its start in classical antiquity, through to its incorporation in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, to its secularized versions in the Enlightenment, and culminating in the philosophy of Rousseau and the hard reality of the French Revolution. The subjectivist turn is especially emphasized in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose focus on enthusiastic conviction and the primacy of the subject makes him the prophet of the modern world. Although Fichte wrote at the turn of the 19th century, it is in our day that his orientation has triumphed. His story, and the stories of those leading up to him – the leading characters in “the Rise and Fall of Natural Law” – are crucial to understanding the genesis of the modern world.

The book presents a new focus on the legal philosophical texts of Aristotle, which offers a much richer frame for the understanding of practical thought, legal reasoning and political experience. It allows understanding how human beings interact in a complex world, and how extensive the complexity is which results from humans’ own power of self-construction and autonomy. The Aristotelian approach recognizes the limits of rationality and the

inevitable and constitutive contingency in Law. All this offers a helpful instrument to understand the changes globalisation imposes to legal experience today. The contributions in this collection do not merely pay attention to private virtues, but focus primarily on public virtues. They deal with the fact that law is dependent on political power and that a person can never be sure about the facts of a case or about the right way to act. They explore the assumption that a detailed knowledge of Aristotle's epistemology is necessary, because of the direct connection between Enlightened reasoning and legal positivism. They pay attention to the concept of proportionality, which can be seen as a precondition to discuss liberalism.

Extensive analysis of the norms and legal institutions of the African Union and their relevance to Africa's quest for peace.

This work provides a rational framework for legislation. The unifying premise behind the essays is that, although legislation and regulation are the result of a political process, legislation and regulation can be the object of theoretical study. The volume focuses on problems that are common to most European legal systems and the approach involves applying to legislative problems the tools of legal theory - hence 'legisprudence'. Whereas traditional legal theory deals predominantly with the application of law by the judge, legisprudence enlarges the field

of study so as to include the creation of law by the legislator. The original essays published in this collection expose and develop a range of new insights into the relationship between legislative problems and legal theory in a way which will engage and interest legal scholars throughout the world.

The central question in legal philosophy is the relationship between law and morality. The legal systems of many countries around the world have been influenced by the principles of the Enlightenment: freedom, equality and fraternity. The position is similar in relation to the accompanying state ideal of the democratic constitutional state as well as the notion of a welfare state. The foundation of these principles lies in the ideal of individual autonomy. The law must in this view guarantee a social order which secures the equal freedom of all. This freedom is moreover fundamental because in modern pluralistic societies a great diversity of views exist concerning the appropriate way of life. This freedom ideal is however also strongly contested. In Law, Order and Freedom, a historical overview is given pertaining to the question of the extent to which the modern Enlightenment values can serve as the universal foundation of law and society.

This anthology of classical and contemporary philosophical and legal essays and legal cases focuses on legal philosophy as its own subject--rather than as an outgrowth of social or

political philosophy or applied ethics. The essays focus on how law is organized and the particular philosophical issues that law raises-- and gives readers the opportunity to think through actual debates—many of them still live in the courts. Provides short introductions and thought-provoking questions for each selection. The Practice of Law. The Rule of Law. The Moral Force of Law. Elements of Legal Reasoning. Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Classical Perspectives. Formalism and Legal Realism. The Contemporary Debate: Hart v. Dworkin. Law and Economics. Critical Legal Theory and Feminist Jurisprudence. Punishment: Theory and Practice. Problems of Criminal Liability. The Rights of Defendants. Compensating for Private Harms: The Law of Torts. Private Ownership: The Law of Property. Private Agreements: the Law of Contract. Constitutional Government and the Problem of Interpretation. Freedom of Religion, Speech and Privacy. Equality and the Constitution. For anyone interested in the law.

Philosophy of Law: An Introduction provides an ideal starting point for students of philosophy and law as it assumse no prior knowledge of either subject. The book is structured around the key issues and themes in the philosophy of law, including: what is the law? - exploring the major legal theories of realism, positivism and natural law the reach of the law - covering authority, rights, liberty, privacy and tolerance criminal responsibility and punishment - including legal defenses, crime, diminished responsibility and theories of punishment. The second edition is updated with important developments in English law, the general impact of the Human Rights Act and the defence of necessity in relation to the Case of the Conjoined Twins. Radical Marxism, feminist, critical legal studies and critical race theories are also explained against the background of controversy between postmodernism and defences of modernity. New chapters

assess the value of traditional legal theory and various critical perspectives and study questions at the end of each chapter help students explore the most important issues in philosophy of law.

Volume 11, the sixth of the historical volumes of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, offers a fresh, philosophically engaged, critical interpretation of the main currents of jurisprudential thought in the English-speaking world of the 20th century. It tells the tale of two lectures and their legacies: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s "The Path of Law" (1897) and H.L.A. Hart's Holmes Lecture, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958). Holmes's radical challenge to late 19th century legal science gave birth to a rich variety of competing approaches to understanding law and legal reasoning from realism to economic jurisprudence to legal pragmatism, from recovery of key elements of common law jurisprudence and rule of law doctrine in the work of Llewellyn, Fuller and Hayek to root-and-branch attacks on the ideology of law by the Critical Legal Studies and Feminist movements. Hart, simultaneously building upon and transforming the undations of Austinian analytic jurisprudence laid in the early 20th century, introduced rigorous philosophical method to English-speaking jurisprudence and offered a reinterpretation of legal positivism which set the agenda for analytic legal philosophy to the end of the century and beyond. A wide-ranging debate over the role of moral principles in legal reasoning, sparked by Dworkin's fundamental challenge to Hart's theory, generated competing interpretations of and fundamental challenges to core doctrines of Hart's positivism, including the nature and role of conventions at the foundations of law and the methodology of philosophical jurisprudence.

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in

his two previous collections: Retribution, Justice and Therapy and Retribution Reconsidered. Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice.

Plato's Laws is one of the most important surviving works of ancient Greek political thought. It offers sustained reflection on the enterprise of legislation, and on its role in the social and religious regulation of society in all its aspects. Many of its ideas were drawn upon by later political thinkers, from Aristotle and Cicero to Thomas More and Montesquieu. This book presents the first translation of the complete text of the Laws for thirty-five years, in Tom Griffith's readable and reliable English. Malcolm Schofield, a leading scholar of Greek philosophy, introduces the main themes and characteristics of the work, as well as supplying authoritative notes on the structure and detail of Plato's argument, together with a guide to further reading. The book will be a key resource for those interested in Greek philosophy and of the history of political thought.

In this age of collections that is ours, many volumes of collections are published. They contain contributions of several well-known authors, and their aim is to present a selective overview of a relevant field of study. This book has the same purpose. Its aim is to introduce students, scholars and all those interested in current problems of legal theory and legal philosophy to the work of the leading scholars in

this field. The large number of publications, both books and articles, that have been produced over recent decades makes it quite difficult, however, for those who are making their first steps in this domain to find firm guidelines. The book is new in its genre because of its method. The choice was made not to reprint an example of contributors' earlier basic articles or a part of one of their books. This would only give a partial view of the rich texture of their work. Rather, the authors were asked to make an original synthesis of their own contributions to the field of legal theory and legal philosophy. Brought together in this volume, they constitute a truly author-ised view of their work. This book is also new in that each essay is complemented with bibliographical information in order to encourage further research on the author's self-selected work. This will help the reader rapidly to become familiar with the whole of the published work of the contributors.

This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate. Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses. Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal

disagreements?